A Proposal for an NYPD Inspector General by Andrew Sullivan & Faiza Patel
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law
A ProPosAl for An nYPD 
InsPector GenerAl
Faiza Patel and Andrew Sullivan
ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is a non-partisan public policy and law 
institute that focuses on the fundamental issues of democracy and justice. Our work ranges from voting rights 
to campaign finance reform, from racial justice in criminal law to Constitutional protection in the fight against 
terrorism. A singular institution — part think tank, part public interest law firm, part advocacy group — the 
Brennan Center combines scholarship, legislative and legal advocacy, and communications to win meaningful, 
measurable change in the public sector.
ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER’S  
LIBERTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
The Brennan Center’s Liberty and National Security Program works to advance effective national security policies 
that respect Constitutional values and the rule of law, using innovative policy recommendations, litigation, and 
public advocacy. The program focuses on government transparency and accountability; domestic counterterrorism 
policies and their effects on privacy and First Amendment freedoms; detainee policy, including the detention, 
interrogation, and trial of terrorist suspects; and the need to safeguard our system of checks and balances.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank R. Kyle Alagood, Sadia Ahsanuddin, Madeline Friedman, Elizabeth Goitein, 
Eric Lane, Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Jim Lyons, Desiree Ramos Reiner, and Frederick A.O. Schwarz for their 
invaluable input and assistance. We appreciate the guidance and support of Michael Waldman and John Kowal. 
The author also greatly benefited from conversations with Zachary Carter, Glenn Fine, Lawrence Pedowitz, Sung-
Hee Suh, Stephen Schulhofer, and the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition. In addition, we are grateful for 
the advice and comments of Jethro Eisenstein, Udi Ofer, Hina Shamsi, Shirin Sinnar, and Matthew Waxman.  
The Brennan Center is grateful to the CS Fund/Warsh-Mott Legacy and the Security & Rights Collaborative, a 
Proteus Fund initiative, for supporting this report. We also thank The Atlantic Philanthropies, Democracy Alliance 
Partners, Herb Block Foundation, and Open Society Foundations for their generous support of our Liberty & 
National Security Program.  
This report has been prepared by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, but does not 
purport to present the school’s institutional views, if any.
© 2012. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons “Attribution-No Derivs-NonCommercial” license (see http://
creativecommons.org). It may be reproduced in its entirety as long as the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is 
credited, a link to the Center’s web pages is provided, and no charge is imposed. The paper may not be reproduced in part or 
in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the Center’s permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Faiza Patel serves as Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program, which seeks to ensure that our 
government respects human rights and fundamental freedoms in conducting the fight against terrorism. She is 
also the Chair of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. Before 
joining the Brennan Center, Ms. Patel worked as a senior policy officer at the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. She clerked for Judge Sidhwa at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, and previously worked as an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton in Washington, DC. 
Ms. Patel is a graduate of Harvard College and NYU School of Law.
Ms. Patel is the author of Rethinking Radicalization, a critical analysis of law enforcement theories that suggest 
that Muslim religious behavior can be considered a proxy for terrorist leanings. Her academic work has been 
published in the American Journal of International Law, the Emory Journal of International Law, the European 
Journal of International Law, the Hague Yearbook of International Law, and the NYU Journal of International Law 
and Politics. She has contributed to a number of books, including The Research Handbook of International Criminal 
Law (Edward Elgar, 2011), Treaty Enforcement and Cooperation in International Criminal Matters (T.M.C. Asser, 
2002), and The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities (United Nations 
Press, 2006). Ms. Patel is a frequent commentator on national security and counterterrorism issues for media 
outlets such as MSNBC, Al Jazeera, NPR, the New York Times, the Economist, the Guardian, the New York Daily 
News, the National Law Journal, the Huffington Post, and Roll Call.
Andrew Sullivan was Pro Bono Counsel in the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for 
Justice, where his research focused on oversight of local law enforcement agencies. Before coming to the Brennan 
Center, Mr. Sullivan was an associate at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP. He received his J.D. from 
Columbia Law School and his B.A. from Williams College.

Table of ConTenTs
  executive summary 1
 Introduction   3
I.  nypd Counterterrorism and Intelligence operations 4
	 A.	Size	and	Scope	 4
	 B.	Cooperation	with	Federal	Agencies	 5
		 	
II.  Models for Conducting Intelligence oversight 6
	 A.	History	of	Federal	Intelligence	Oversight				 6
	 B.	Oversight	After	9/11	 7
		 C.	Local	Police	Departments	and	Independent	Oversight	 9
	
III.  oversight of nypd operations 10
	 A.	Internal	Affairs	and	the	Commission	to	Combat	Police	Corruption		 11
	 B.	Civilian	Complaint	Review	Board	 11
		 C.	Department	of	Investigation	 12
		 D.	New	York	City	Council	 13
	 E.	U.S.	Attorneys	and	District	Attorneys	 13
IV.  Court oversight and enforcement 14
	 A.	Handschu		 14
	 1.	Investigations	 15
	 2.	Intelligence	Collection	 16
	 B.	Other	Litigation	 17
V.   lessons learned from the Inspector General and police  18 
auditor oversight Models
	 A.	Credibility	 18
	 B.	Access	 18
	 C.	Support	from	other	Governmental	Bodies	 19
	 nypd oversight proposal 20
 Conclusion  22
 endnotes  24

  A ProPosAl for An nYPD InsPector GenerAl | 1
exeCuTIVe suMMary
Over the last decade, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), like state and local law enforcement 
agencies around the country, has become increasingly involved in collecting counterterrorism intelligence. 
But the NYPD’s counterterrorism and intelligence gathering operations are unique among municipal police 
departments, both in size and character. The magnitude of these operations vastly exceeds that of similar 
efforts in other major cities: In 2010, the NYPD’s budget for counterterrorism and intelligence was over $100 
million and the two divisions reportedly employed 1000 officers. Equally important, while New York City 
police cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on counterterrorism matters, they also conduct 
intelligence operations and investigations completely separate from federal authorities. The creation of this 
stand-alone capability was a stated goal of Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, and is an accomplishment 
frequently highlighted by the Department. 
Unlike the FBI and other national intelligence agencies, the NYPD’s sizable counterterrorism and intelligence 
operations operate largely free from independent oversight. Currently, oversight of the NYPD – as conducted 
by the Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption and the Civilian 
Complaint Review Board – focuses almost exclusively on police corruption and individual police misconduct. 
The City-wide Department of Investigation similarly focuses on corruption, incompetence, and misconduct 
in 300 municipal agencies and, in any event, does not cover the police. The City Council has supervisory 
jurisdiction over the police, but has rarely examined its intelligence operations. Control mechanisms established 
by a 1980s consent decree largely have been eliminated. 
In the federal system, Congressional supervision informed by reports from independent inspectors general has 
been a crucial tool for increasing transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the realm of intelligence and 
counterterrorism. This oversight system was developed in the wake of the 1970s Congressional investigations 
into the FBI’s and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) illegal collection of intelligence about Americans, and 
both agencies have operated for decades under its strictures. Even after the September 11th attacks, this system 
continues to function well and has, in fact, been strengthened. The FBI, in particular, has benefitted from a 
robust inspector general who has contributed to the effectiveness of its counterterrorism programs through 
reviews of issues ranging from the need for the Bureau to develop a comprehensive risk assessment of the 
terrorist threat to its use of the new intelligence techniques that have been authorized over the last decade. 
Given that the NYPD has built an intelligence and counterterrorism capability more in line with the FBI than 
a traditional urban police force, it is time to build an oversight structure that is appropriate for its size and 
functions. An independent inspector general should be established for the NYPD. This would be an enormous 
step forward for police accountability and oversight for several reasons: 
•  ENSURING TRANSPARENCY – The inspector general would be in a position to make policing 
more transparent, thus allowing the Mayor and the City Council to better exercise their oversight 
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responsibilities and increase public confidence in policing. Reliable information about how policies 
and legal constraints are implemented is especially important in the context of intelligence operations, 
the specifics of which are often necessarily concealed.
•  PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES – As the NYPD continues its important work of keeping New 
Yorkers safe, the inspector general would have the mandate, expertise, and perspective to make sure 
that it does so consistent with our constitutionally guaranteed liberties.  
•  REFORMING FROM WITHIN – The inspector general would be in a position to work with the police 
cooperatively to address any problems in the Department’s operations and to keep track of progress.   
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InTroduCTIon
As the nation’s largest police force, the NYPD is charged with keeping New York City’s diverse population 
safe, not only from crime but also from terrorism. The Department has been given far-reaching authority to 
fulfill these duties. Although New York City has seen dramatic drops in crime and has been spared a successful 
terrorist attack for more than a decade, questions have been raised about some of the NYPD’s operations and 
policies. One longstanding issue has been the extent to which the Department’s “stop, question and frisk” policy 
disproportionately targets minorities.1 In addition, the Associated Press (AP), in a recent Pulitzer Prize-winning 
series of stories about the NYPD’s intelligence operations, suggested that the Department was monitoring 
American Muslim communities even where there was no indication of suspicious activity.2 In both cases, questions 
have been raised about whether an unintended side effect of these policies and practices has been to alienate the 
very communities whose cooperation the police sorely need to help keep the City safe. 
This report focuses on oversight of the NYPD’s intelligence operations. Although a number of substantive legal 
rules set the boundaries of these types of programs, history has shown that it is exceedingly difficult to ensure that 
intelligence agencies adhere to these limits. Intelligence gathering, by its very nature, is clandestine and details of 
operations often cannot be publicly revealed. And while law enforcement agencies should be proactive in their 
approach to crime and terrorism, broad powers to collect intelligence in pursuit of these goals can, and have 
historically, bled into abuse. 
In grappling with the challenge of ensuring that intelligence agencies comply with the law but retain sufficient 
room to fulfill their mandate, the federal government has instituted a system of oversight for these agencies, 
including the FBI and the CIA. Both agencies are monitored by independent inspectors general who report 
to Congress, and the agencies themselves report regularly to Congressional committees. While this system is 
by no means perfect, it has contributed significantly to transparency and accountability in federal intelligence 
operations.
The NYPD has no comparable system of independent oversight. The external oversight structures that are 
currently in place are severely limited in various ways. Most important, they generally focus on corruption or 
individual cases of police misconduct and not on the Department’s policies and practices. An independent review 
of NYPD policies and practices is particularly important when it comes to intelligence operations. Because of 
the secrecy attached to these operations, it can be difficult to evaluate their scope, legality, and effectiveness. 
Take the case of the deployment of confidential informants and undercover officers at mosques. Internal police 
documents show that the NYPD had confidential informants and undercover officers in a number of mosques 
around the City who reported to the police on what people were saying in response to current events. But the 
Police Commissioner has stated that the Department’s policy is to only send these agents into mosques based on 
specific leads.3 The very number of mosques monitored by the Department raises questions, but without more 
information, an outside observer cannot know for certain whether or not the NYPD was following legitimate 
leads into each of these mosques.
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This report outlines the benefits of an oversight system for the NYPD comparable to that which has for decades 
governed the FBI and the CIA. As with federal oversight, a key aspect of this new system would be an independent 
inspector general. Section 1 describes what is publicly known about the extent of the NYPD’s counterterrorism 
and intelligence operations, demonstrating that these are of sufficient scope to warrant systematic oversight. 
Section 2 explains how oversight of federal intelligence agencies has developed since the 1970s and how the 
establishment of inspectors general has contributed to transparency, accountability, and effectiveness with respect 
to these agencies. It also examines the movement among local police departments to increase accountability 
by using independent police auditors. Section 3 turns to oversight of the NYPD’s intelligence operations. This 
section reviews the entities currently responsible for police oversight and concludes that they by and large focus 
on police corruption and individual cases of misconduct. Meaningful independent oversight of police programs 
and policies is lacking. Section 4 examines the role of the courts as oversight mechanisms. While courts have an 
important role to play in ensuring that the police comply with legal requirements, an inspector general could 
greatly enhance their ability to do so by monitoring implementation of applicable rules on an ongoing basis. 
Section 5 outlines the factors that have contributed to the success of inspectors general and police auditors. The 
concluding section of the report recommends the establishment of an inspector general for the NYPD and, 
drawing on the experience of the federal government and other police departments, identifies the key structural 
elements necessary to ensure that the inspector general will be successful. 
I.  nypd CounTerTerrorIsM and InTellIGenCe operaTIons
a.  size and scope 
With a budget of approximately $4.5 billion4 and 34,500 officers, the NYPD is the largest police department 
in the country,5 employing as many officers as the next four largest U.S. cities combined.6 In the wake of 
the September 11th attacks, the NYPD’s Commissioner Kelly concluded that the City could not rely on 
federal agencies alone to prevent terrorist attacks and should build its own intelligence and counterterrorism 
capabilities.7 Commissioner Kelly engaged a former high-level CIA official to restructure the Department’s 
Intelligence Division and to upgrade its intelligence gathering and analysis 
capability. He also created a Counterterrorism Bureau, which is charged with 
designing and implementing counterterrorism projects, training police officers to 
respond to terrorist attacks, and evaluating threats to the City’s infrastructure.8 
Combined, these two units have a budget of more than $100 million9 and employ 
approximately 1,000 officers.10 By way of comparison, that is more than three 
times the size of the next largest municipal counterterrorism operation: The Los 
Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) Counterterrorism and Special Operations 
Bureau, which has 300 officers.11
With a budget of approximately 
$4.5 billion and 34,500 officers, 
the nypd is the largest police 
department in the country. It 
operates a large, autonomous 
intelligence operation that covers 
the City, surrounding states and 
several foreign cities.
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The NYPD’s intelligence operations are not limited to New York City, but have extended to neighboring states, 
such as New Jersey.12 In addition, the Intelligence Division operates an International Liaison Program through 
which its officers are stationed in 11 overseas locations, including London, Paris, Madrid, Cairo and Tel Aviv.13 
Although these officers’ salaries are paid by the Department, all other expenses are covered by the privately 
funded and managed New York City Police Foundation.14 The budget for the overseas program is not public and 
the officers operate independently of federal officials at these stations,15 but under the supervision of an NYPD 
assistant commissioner.16
In sum, there can be no doubt that the NYPD operates a large, autonomous intelligence operation that covers the City, 
surrounding states, and several foreign cities. 
b.  Cooperation with federal agencies
The NYPD also participates in some federal counterterrorism initiatives. It is a member of the FBI-led Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), to which it contributes some 125 NYPD detectives and supervisors.17 JTTFs are 
the lead investigative entities for federal terrorism investigations. The exact contours of the NYPD’s relationship 
with the New York JTTF are not known because the NYPD has declined to make public the terms of this 
cooperation.18 Other cities have, however, released the agreements governing their relationship with the FBI,19 
and the “standard” agreement is available online.20 Based upon these documents, it is likely that the NYPD 
officers who work with the JTTF are deputized as federal marshals and work in accordance with FBI rules and 
regulations on intelligence collection.21 It is not clear how the NYPD ensures that police officers assigned to the 
JTTF comply with specific standards on intelligence collection that apply to the Department but not the federal 
government22 – e.g., the so-called “Handschu Guidelines” and New York City’s racial profiling law, both of which 
are discussed later in this report.23
 
The NYPD also belongs to the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC), established in 2003 by the New 
York State Police and the New York State Office of Homeland Security. NYSIC is a “fusion center” – i.e., a 
place where several agencies collaborate to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist and criminal intelligence 
information. The extent of the NYPD’s involvement in the NYSIC is not known, although there have been 
reports that the Department is not fully integrated into the Center’s activities.24
Finally, it has been reported that the NYPD cooperates with the CIA on intelligence operations.25 These 
connections are most apparent in the realm of staffing: the NYPD’s intelligence operations were built by a former 
CIA official, David Cohen;26 in 2002, another senior CIA operative, Lawrence Sanchez, was brought in to assist 
with the Intelligence Division and remained employed by the CIA for part of his tenure at the NYPD;27 NYPD 
Detective Steve Pinkall trained at CIA training facilities and then returned home to supervise investigations;28 and 
in 2011, the CIA sent an unidentified clandestine operative to work as Cohen’s special assistant, while remaining 
on the CIA payroll.29
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II.  Models for ConduCTInG InTellIGenCe oVersIGhT 
Given the extent of the NYPD’s intelligence operations, the question naturally arises as to how these operations 
are best overseen. The federal government has grappled with the issue of intelligence oversight for the last 40 
odd years. It has developed a system of congressional oversight informed by the work of independent inspectors 
general. Indeed, as U.S. intelligence operations have expanded since the September 11th attacks, federal inspectors 
general have proven a distinctly useful mechanism for monitoring these operations. At the same time, local 
police departments have increasingly turned to external oversight mechanisms similar to inspectors general (often 
called police auditors) to address traditional problems of police misconduct and corruption. These developments 
demonstrate that external oversight can provide a useful means of ensuring the legality and effectiveness of police 
operations in general, and intelligence activities in particular.
a.  History of Federal Intelligence Oversight  
Until the mid-1970s, the federal government followed a laissez faire philosophy towards intelligence operations, 
largely exempting them from the types of regulation and oversight under which other government agencies 
operated.30 In 1975, prompted in part by a series of articles in The New York Times about CIA spying inside 
the U.S., Congress began investigating the intelligence community. It launched two investigations: the Church 
Committee in the Senate31 and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives.32 The White House 
launched its own more limited probe, led by then-Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.33 Government investigators 
uncovered a “startling number of intelligence transgressions,” both international and domestic.34 The Church 
Committee in particular exposed the extent of the FBI’s spying, including the keeping of intelligence files on over 
a million American citizens, a plan to spy on Americans who protested the Vietnam War, and the infiltration of 
a range of civil society groups from universities to churches to newspapers.35 Perhaps the most notorious of these 
activities was the FBI’s counterintelligence program, code named COINTELPRO, under which agents conducted 
smear campaigns against civil rights leaders and many others.36 Loch Johnson, a political science professor who 
worked on the Church Committee, wrote: “The effects of this catalog of improprieties were profound. From 1975 
onwards, America’s support for an unbound intelligence capability would have to compete with another principle 
that had long guided the rest of the government: liberty — the safeguarding of the American people against the 
power of their own government.”37
The recognition that intelligence agencies operating on American soil could pose a potentially serious threat 
to civil liberties led to a series of reforms. The Senate and the House both established permanent intelligence 
oversight committees.38 The Attorney General banned the FBI from opening investigations without a suspicion 
of criminal activity.39 Congress passed a number of laws designed to increase review of intelligence operations, 
including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which required warrants for national security wiretaps and 
established a court to review these warrant requests in secret.40 
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One of the most important of these measures was the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act).41 While this 
statute “responded largely to concerns over ‘fraud, abuse and waste’ in federal programs, it was recognized even in 
that period that [inspectors general], at least in intelligence agencies, had the potential to monitor constitutional 
concerns.”42 At first, the IG Act did not cover agencies with intelligence responsibilities. These agencies resisted 
independent inspectors general, arguing that the office would “jeopardize secrecy, illegally displace executive 
authority, or otherwise threaten law enforcement and intelligence operations.”43 But Congress was unpersuaded 
that these agencies’ unique characteristics precluded the establishment of independent inspectors general.44 Over 
the next three decades, inspectors general were established for nearly all major intelligence agencies.
b.  Oversight After 9/11
The inspectors general of federal intelligence agencies have played important roles in making their agencies more 
effective and in reviewing the impact of national security measures on individual rights. They have increased 
transparency about these secretive spheres of action and prompted important reforms of agency policies and 
practices. Inspectors general are particularly suited to supervising the work of intelligence agencies because they 
provide a relatively unintrusive mechanism that can meet the twin goals of allowing intelligence professionals to 
do their jobs while ensuring that they operate efficiently and within legal constraints. 
Indeed, as Congress has expanded intelligence authorities in order to help fight 
terrorism, it also has increased oversight by inspectors general, particularly 
with respect to civil rights and civil liberties. Shortly after the Department of 
Homeland Security was established, it was assigned an inspector general who 
was required to designate a senior official to oversee civil rights and civil liberties 
issues.45 A new inspector general has recently been established for the intelligence 
community at large.46 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Patriot Act) explicitly requires 
the Department of Justice inspector general (DOJ IG) to monitor complaints 
of individual rights violations.47 And Congress has on several occasions asked 
inspectors general to investigate and report on programs that pose particular civil liberties threats, such as the 
warrantless wiretapping program conducted by the National Security Agency under President George W. Bush48 
and the use of national security letters by the FBI.49
In short, Congress has recognized that increased intelligence authorities must be accompanied by increased 
vigilance, particularly in evaluating how these authorities affect individual rights, and has designated inspectors 
general to play a critical role in monitoring and reporting on these matters. The recent example of the DOJ IG – 
who covers the FBI – demonstrates the important role that an inspector general can play. Glenn Fine, who served 
as DOJ IG under three administrations from 2000 to 2011, investigated several national security policies that 
have major implications for individual rights, including the FBI’s intelligence collection operations and its use of 
immigration detention in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. 
Congress has recognized 
that increased intelligence 
authorities must be accompanied 
by increased vigilance, 
particularly in evaluating 
how these authorities affect 
individual rights.
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Perhaps the best-known examples of Fine’s work are his three reports on the use of national security letters.50 
National security letters are administrative subpoenas that the government can use to obtain consumer records 
(e.g., from phone companies, banks, and internet service providers) without a court order. The Patriot Act made 
it easier for the government to obtain this information.51 Fine’s reports on national security letters supported the 
FBI’s position that national security letters had been useful for terrorism investigations,52 but criticized the Bureau 
for violating its own rules on when to use these letters and for its failure to uncover violations through internal 
audits.53 Additionally, Fine found that the FBI had skirted even very lenient requirements for obtaining national 
security letters in “exigent” circumstances. For example, FBI agents had gathered phone records by “scribbling 
requests on post-it notes or taking ‘quick peeks’ at the computer screens of phone company personnel.”54 Fine’s 
national security letter reports recommended a number of changes to FBI procedures to ensure that the FBI itself 
would catch such problems. Many of these were implemented by the Bureau, with progress tracked by the DOJ 
IG.55 In addition, the FBI ended its use of exigent letters.56
Fine’s reports on national security letters demonstrate how an inspector general can assist Congress in exercising its 
oversight responsibilities. The reports prompted hearings in both houses that examined the FBI’s use of national 
security letters and its procedures for ensuring that this authority was properly deployed. These hearings were 
part of Congress’s consideration of whether to renew the FBI’s authority under the Patriot Act to use these letters 
and whether it was necessary to impose further safeguards on their use.57  Although Congress ultimately decided 
to renew these authorities without further safeguards (albeit with a sunset), it did so with eyes open and with far 
better information than would otherwise have been the case.
The DOJ IG’s work has not been limited to analyzing the impact of FBI operations 
on individual rights, but also to improving their effectiveness. Shortly after 9/11, for 
example, Fine reviewed the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program, focusing on: (1) progress 
toward developing a national-level risk assessment of the terrorist threat; (2) whether 
the FBI’s strategic planning process provided a sound basis to identify counterterrorism 
requirements; and (3) the amount of resources dedicated to the program.58 Fine found 
that the Bureau had not properly followed previous recommendations relating to the need 
for a comprehensive threat assessment and recommended specific corrective actions.59 
In addition, as the FBI attempted to change its orientation towards counterterrorism 
intelligence gathering after the September 11th attacks, Fine analyzed whether it had 
reallocated personnel to reflect new priorities and the impact of such changes on the 
Bureau’s traditional crime fighting activities.60 The analysis provided a tool for the FBI’s management to “evaluat[e] 
progress in meeting goals and obtaining a data-based view of the status of FBI operations.”61 Fine recommended that 
the FBI should conduct this type of review on a regular basis, and in a follow-up audit examined the Bureau’s progress 
in instituting this type of review.62
The experience of the FBI demonstrates the value of independent oversight in spotting and curtailing abuse and 
evaluating effectiveness. Importantly, inspector general oversight is not a “one off” event – inspectors general not only 
Inspector general oversight 
is not a “one off” event – 
inspectors general not only 
point out problems and make 
recommendations for changes, 
they also monitor agencies to 
ensure that necessary reforms 
are implemented. 
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point out problems and make recommendations for changes, they also monitor agencies to ensure that necessary 
reforms are implemented. Such ongoing oversight is now more critical than ever because intelligence agencies at all 
levels of government – federal, state and local – have become involved in gathering information about Americans even 
where there is no suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity.
C.  Local Police Departments and Independent Oversight
The federal government is not alone in seeing the virtues of independent oversight. A number of cities have 
created a range of mechanisms “allowing them to administer an independent oversight process, beyond the reach 
of the police force.”63
One particularly apposite example is the system used by the Los Angeles police, in which an inspector general 
reports to an independent Board of Police Commissioners. The establishment of an independent inspector 
general was one of the key recommendations of the commission that was formed in 1991 to review the LAPD’s 
operations after the videotaped beating of Rodney King made headlines across the country.64
Given its origin in traditional police misconduct scandals, the LAPD’s inspector general focuses on the 
department’s internal disciplinary process.65 The LAPD inspector general may undertake special investigations 
directed by the Board or on his own initiative and has reviewed the Department’s counterterrorism operations.66 
Detailed reports on the inspector general’s investigations are provided to the Board of Police Commissioners. 
Public versions are also made available.
The inspector general’s annual audits of the LAPD’s Anti-terrorism Intelligence Section Unit (LAPD 
Intelligence Unit) illustrate what an inspector general review of some aspects of a police department’s 
intelligence operations might look like. The LAPD separates intelligence investigations from criminal 
investigations.67 To initiate an intelligence investigation, the LAPD Intelligence Unit generally must have 
an articulable “reasonable suspicion” (although prompt and limited checking of leads is permitted).68 The 
inspector general’s 2008/2009 review analyzed the LAPD Intelligence Unit’s files to determine whether the 
“appropriate threshold was met” in opening investigations.69 The review also evaluated whether surveillance 
operations were properly authorized. LAPD Intelligence Unit investigators requesting surveillance resources 
are required to complete an Operational Plan which includes “the name of the subject, the rationale 
for conducting the surveillance and the required signatures indicating the authorization to conduct the 
operation.”70 The inspector general found no Operational Plans in 46 percent of the files reviewed, and 
concluded that LAPD lacked a system for ensuring completion of these plans, risking surveillance that was 
ineffective and did not comply with established standards.71 The police responded by standardizing the 
process for completing Operational Plans and implementing a record-keeping system.72
The 2009/2010 audit of the LAPD Intelligence Unit focused on ensuring that criminal investigations were not 
used to circumvent the stricter rules governing intelligence investigations.73 As the inspector general explained: 
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“Intelligence investigations are subject to extensive scrutiny to guard against 
constitutional violations involving freedom of association, free speech, and unlawful 
searches and seizures.”74 The inspector general found that while the LAPD was not 
using criminal investigations to get around the stricter rules for opening intelligence 
investigations, it should ensure that the steps taken to avoid circumvention were 
reflected in its files.75 Also in 2009/2010, the inspector general found that the 
LAPD Intelligence Unit had not adequately documented “reasonable suspicion” 
before commencing an open-ended intelligence investigation involving a cluster 
of cases.76 In response, the police provided the inspector general with additional 
documentation supporting suspicion in the cases at issue and instituted a program to train personnel to ensure 
that evidence of reasonable suspicion was documented.77  
The LAPD inspector general is representative of a broader movement to enhance police accountability through 
the use of permanent external police auditors. As the prominent policing scholar Samuel Walker has pointed 
out: “Two of the greatest shortcomings of past reform efforts have been the failure to implement recommended 
reforms and the failure to ensure that reforms, once implemented, are maintained.”78 A police auditor facilitates 
the implementation and maintenance of reforms because the auditor’s office is “a permanent government agency 
with both the authority and the resources to conduct continuing investigations of police issues.”79 Another 
advantage of the police auditor model, especially when compared to civilian complaint boards, is that auditors 
concentrate on systemic issues rather than on individual misconduct.80 This type of “focus on reviewing policies and 
procedures for the purpose of changing the organization” is considered by many policing experts to be the best path 
to deterring police misconduct.81
As the next section demonstrates, the NYPD is not subject to oversight in the manner of federal intelligence agencies 
and several major police departments. 
III.  oVersIGhT of nypd operaTIons
New York, like all major American cities, has a long history of efforts to develop oversight mechanisms for its police 
force. These have largely been directed at developing ways of ensuring that police officers do not abuse their authority 
through corruption or misconduct.82 To this end, New York City established two major investigative commissions: 
The 1970 Knapp Commission83 and the 1992 Mollen Commission.84 The latter’s recommendations prompted 
efforts by the City Council to create an independent commission to monitor the Department.85 The independent 
commission established was challenged by the Mayor and struck down by courts because it included members 
appointed by the City Council in contravention of the Mayor’s appointment authority under the City Charter.86 
Eventually, then-Mayor Giuliani created the Commission to Combat Police Corruption as an entity independent 
from the police department, but with limited powers.87 In addition, the City Charter was revised to establish the 
Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB).88 The NYPD itself has taken steps to strengthen its internal oversight 
through its 1993 revamping of the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB).89 These efforts to combat police corruption have 
been only partially successful, with high-profile cases of abuse emerging every few years.90  
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In response to recent calls for stronger oversight of the Department’s intelligence operations, the Police Commissioner 
has declared that the NYPD is subject to multiple levels of oversight. He has pointed to its own IAB, the Commission 
to Combat Police Corruption, the CCRB, and New York’s five district attorneys and two U.S. attorneys.91 But this 
long list obscures the reality that no neutral observer is charged with monitoring the Department’s policies and 
practices to ensure they comply with applicable rules, much less for effectiveness.
To begin with, purely internal mechanisms like the IAB are no substitute for independent review by a neutral 
and objective outsider. And, as the discussion below demonstrates, none of the institutions identified by the 
Commissioner have ever monitored Department-wide policies for compliance with legal standards. Rather, they 
focus on issues of corruption or criminal behavior by individual police officers. Other potential oversight bodies not 
mentioned by Commissioner Kelly – i.e., the Department of Investigations and the City Council – have also not 
played an active role in oversight.92 
a.  Internal Affairs and the Commission to Combat Police Corruption 
The mission of the IAB is to “provide for effective corruption control through analyzing corruption allegations 
and trends.”93 It investigates complaints about individual police officers. A review of several of its annual reports 
shows that it does not assess the legality of policies and practices such as those of the Intelligence Division.94 
Moreover, because the IAB is under the jurisdiction of an NYPD chief who reports to the Commissioner, it 
is not independent from the Department.95 Indeed, it was in part because of complaints about the IAB’s lack 
of autonomy in investigating high-profile cases that Mayor Giuliani, in 1995, established the Commission to 
Combat Police Corruption (Mayor’s Commission).
The Mayor’s Commission, which consists of five of his appointees, performs audits, studies, and analyses to “assess 
the quality of the Police Department’s systems for combating corruption” and to examine conditions and attitudes 
in the Department that may support corruption.96 It may also accept complaints of police corruption.97 Because 
of its small size (until recently it employed only two lawyers and had a budget of $560,000) and its reliance on the 
cooperation of the Department (it cannot compel the NYPD to provide witnesses or documents), it is no surprise 
that doubts have been raised about the Commission’s ability to conduct meaningful oversight of matters relating to 
police corruption.98 In addition, the NYPD has taken a narrow view of the Commission’s mandate. In 2005, when 
the Mayor’s Commission tried to investigate allegations that NYPD officers had downgraded crimes from felonies 
to misdemeanors to improve crime statistics,99 the Department declined to cooperate on the grounds that falsifying 
crime statistics was not “corruption” within the mandate of the Mayor’s Commission.100
b.  Civilian Complaint Review Board
The CCRB is the civilian body that reviews complaints against individual police officers.101 Under the City 
Charter, the CCRB is authorized to hear “complaints by members of the public against members of the police 
department that allege misconduct involving excessive use of force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or use of 
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offensive language.”102 The CCRB’s authority over complaints about “abuse of authority” by “members” of the 
Department could theoretically serve as a basis for reviewing the Department’s intelligence operations. But such 
case-specific and sporadic review, focusing on individual complaints, would not amount to systematic oversight 
of the NYPD’s policies and practices. 
In practical terms, moreover, the CCRB has not proved effective even in fulfilling 
its mandate of reviewing complaints against the police. For example, the CCRB 
has the power to “compel the attendance of witnesses and require the production 
of such records and other materials as are necessary for the investigation of 
complaints,”103 and the NYPD is bound to cooperate fully with its investigations.104 
In practice, however, the police have on several occasions been unresponsive to 
the CCRB’s requests, particularly where sensitive operations or personnel are 
involved.105 Most notably, in 2004, when the CCRB attempted to investigate 
the NYPD’s arrest of demonstrators at the Republican National Convention, the 
NYPD refused to cooperate and declined to make its officers available.106 Perhaps most important, the CCRB’s 
credibility as an oversight mechanism is undermined because it can only make recommendations for disciplinary 
action to the Police Commissioner.107 These recommendations are often not followed, even in run-of-the-mill 
police misconduct cases.108
 
C.  Department of Investigation
The Department of Investigation (DOI) is a New York City agency that oversees more than 300 City agencies, 
entities, boards and commissions. Potentially, it has the authority to monitor the NYPD. Under the City 
Charter, the DOI is “authorized and empowered to make any study or investigation which in [the] opinion 
[of the Commissioner of Investigation] may be in the best interests of the city, including, but not limited 
to investigations of the affairs, functions, accounts, methods, personnel or efficiency of any agency.”109 Its 
jurisdiction “extend[s] to any agency, officer, or employee of the city, or any person or entity doing business 
with the city, or any person or entity who is paid or receives money from or through the city or any agency 
of the city.”110 The Commissioner of Investigation exercises this authority by appointing inspectors general to 
monitor City agencies and departments.
Although the DOI’s mandate as expressed in the City Charter is theoretically quite broad, in practice the agency 
operates under a series of executive orders and investigates only “corrupt or other criminal activity, conflicts 
of interest, unethical conduct, misconduct and incompetence.”111 One might view the DOI’s jurisdiction over 
“misconduct” as sufficiently broad to cover policies that potentially violate constitutional rights. However, a 
review of publicly available reports suggests that the DOI takes a more limited view of its role. The Brennan 
Center’s research has not uncovered any instances where the DOI has investigated whether any agency’s 
policies or practices violate constitutional rights.112 Instead, it appears that the DOI regards its role as focused 
on corruption and individual misconduct in the manner of the IAB. The fact that no DOI inspector general is 
assigned for the Department supports this view.113
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d.  New York City Council
Under the New York City Charter, the City Council has both the authority and the obligation to oversee 
the NYPD. The Council, or its committees, are required to “review on a regular and continuous basis the 
activities of the agencies of the city.”114 Each standing committee of the Council must hold at least one annual 
hearing relating to each agency under its jurisdiction.115 In addition, the City Council has the authority to 
investigate “any matters within its jurisdiction relating to the property, affairs, or government of the city.”116 
When performing this role, standing and special committees of the Council have the power to “require the 
attendance and examine and take testimony under oath of such persons as it may deem necessary” and to 
require agencies to produce “books, accounts, papers, and other evidence relative to the inquiry.”117 
Despite this broad authority, the City Council has exercised only limited oversight 
of the NYPD’s intelligence and counterterrorism operations, and Council officials 
have suggested that they lack the institutional capacity to do more. 
From September 11, 2001 until May 2012, the City Council’s Committee on 
Public Safety, which is the standing committee with jurisdiction over the NYPD, 
held 94 hearings, including two hearings per year on the Department’s budget.118 
Four hearings touching upon the NYPD’s counterterrorism operations were held 
between 2001 and 2003. A fifth was held in October 2011 to address “Safety 
in NYC Ten Years After 9/11,” shortly after the AP’s initial revelations of the 
Department’s systematic surveillance of American Muslim communities. This was the first hearing since the 
Intelligence Division was formed in 2002 at which members of the Council asked the Commissioner about the 
activities of the Intelligence Division.119 City Council members also raised questions about these operations at 
the NYPD’s March 2012 budget hearing.120
One reason why the City Council has not been more active in supervising the NYPD’s operations may be 
a perceived lack of institutional capability. The Chair of the City Council’s Public Safety Committee, Peter 
Vallone, Jr., has noted that the Council does not have the expertise to oversee the NYPD’s sophisticated 
intelligence operations.121 Vallone has also pointed out that his committee has a small staff and thus does not 
have the resources to devote to policy-oriented oversight.122 An independent monitor with the expertise and 
resources to produce useful information about, and analyses of, the NYPD’s operations would go far toward 
enabling the Council to more effectively fulfill its oversight responsibilities.
e.  U.S. Attorneys and District Attorneys
New York U.S. Attorneys and District Attorneys do not exercise broad or regular oversight over the Department. 
Investigations of systematic civil rights violations by local police departments are normally undertaken by the 
Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, not the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.123 District Attorneys focus on 
criminal matters and do not generally play a role in these types of systemic investigations.124 
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More fundamentally, the notion that oversight should come in the form of a criminal prosecution or a civil 
enforcement action by the Justice Department is misguided. Such a response should be the last resort, not the 
mechanism of choice to nudge the NYPD back on the right path if it starts to go astray. It constitutes both too 
much oversight, in the sense that it brings the full weight of law enforcement down on the NYPD when a simple 
recommendation to amend a policy may be sufficient, and too little oversight, in the sense that DOJ and the 
District Attorneys have no mandate to proactively keep an eye on the NYPD’s operations.
• • •
As the above discussion demonstrates, external oversight of the NYPD is limited. Where it exists, it is focused 
primarily on police corruption and individual misconduct rather than the type of ongoing, systematic review of 
policies and practices that is performed by inspectors general in federal agencies and police auditors in major local 
police departments.
IV.  CourT oVersIGhT and enforCeMenT 
In addition to the various bodies discussed above, one must also consider the role of the courts in  “overseeing” the 
NYPD’s activities. After all, courts can conclusively determine if police actions are lawful. But while judicial review 
has its place, the courts are not the sole or even the best solution to the need for oversight. Litigation can be time-
consuming and expensive, both for the plaintiffs and for the taxpayers who subsidize the Department’s defense. It 
can take years, during which time the police operate in a legal limbo – continuing the challenged practice at their 
peril or avoiding risk by ceasing activities that may in fact be lawful. Moreover, courts are retrospective institutions 
and generally only act after an alleged legal violation has occurred. They play no 
role in vetting potential policies and practices; they can rarely step in to prevent an 
illegal policy before it is implemented. Their review is naturally limited to legality 
and does not touch upon the efficacy of a policy or practice. Finally, litigation 
often generates a hostile dynamic in which the parties become entrenched in their 
positions, minimizing any possibility of self-examination and self-regulation.
Where courts have stepped in to fashion specific rules for the police, an inspector general can be extremely valuable 
in ensuring sustained implementation of reforms. A review of the most significant consent decree involving the 
NYPD’s surveillance activities, Handschu v. Special Services Division, demonstrates this point.
a.  Handschu
In 1971, a civil rights lawyer named Barbara Handschu and other activists brought suit claiming that the NYPD 
had spied on and attempted to disrupt a number of political groups.125 Fourteen years later, the Department 
settled Handschu v. Special Services Division and agreed to follow a set of guidelines for investigations related to 
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political activity (1985 Handschu Guidelines).126 These guidelines were a mix of substantive rules about what 
the police can and cannot do when conducting investigations of political activity and included an oversight 
mechanism for these types of investigations. They “limited the NYPD’s investigation of political activity to those 
circumstances where there was specific information of criminal activity” and established the Handschu Authority 
to “oversee compliance.”127 In particular, before investigating political activity, the police were required to file a 
statement setting out the criminal predicate for the investigation with the Handschu Authority, a three-member 
panel made up of two high-level police officers and one civilian member appointed by the Mayor.128 This procedure 
did not appear to result in any undue burdens on the police – the Handschu Authority rarely denied a request to 
authorize surveillance and no violation ever resulted in the NYPD being found in contempt of court.  Rather, the 
supervising judge generally only issued informal reprimands or recommendations for further training.129
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the NYPD asked the judge charged with supervising the Handschu 
consent decree to “eliminate the restrictions contained in the [original] Handschu Guidelines and the oversight of 
the Handschu Authority with respect to those restrictions.”130 The court agreed and approved a new set of guidelines 
(2003 Handschu Guidelines) that expanded the NYPD’s authorities and reduced oversight requirements.131 
While the court initially trusted the NYPD’s representations that it would abide by the agreed-upon rules,132 the 
Department’s 2003 arrest and interrogation of 247 anti-war protestors led the presiding judge to incorporate the 
guidelines into the consent decree.133 
Because the 2003 Handschu Guidelines are part of the consent decree, the judge retains the authority to ensure that 
the police abide by them. There is, however, no independent monitor charged with ensuring that the Handschu 
restrictions are implemented. Rather, issues relating to the NYPD’s compliance are raised sporadically when normally 
secret information becomes public through one means or another. An inspector general would be well placed to 
monitor compliance with these types of rules on a continuing basis and to supplement court oversight.
The 2003 Handschu Guidelines include: 1) the rules relating to police investigations that touch on political activity, 
which remain tethered to suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity; and 2) a new section that authorizes the police 
to collect intelligence apart from any particular investigation – i.e., even where there is no suspicion of criminal or 
terrorist activity.  
1.  Investigations 
The 2003 Handschu Guidelines govern “investigations of possible unlawful or terrorist related activity that involve 
political activity,”134 which is defined as “the exercise of a right of expression or association for the purpose of 
maintaining or changing governmental policies or social conditions.”135 
Three levels of investigation are authorized: checking of leads; preliminary inquiry; and full investigation. The 
lowest level of investigative activity, the “prompt and extremely limited checking of leads” is to be undertaken when 
“information is received of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of unlawful activity is warranted.”136 
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This aspect of the 2003 Handschu Guidelines resurfaced recently when the media 
released internal police documents showing that NYPD undercover officers and 
confidential informants were reporting what was said by people in mosques in 
response to international events (e.g., worldwide protests about the publication of 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in Danish newspapers)137 and local 
occurrences (e.g., when a small plane crashed into a building in Manhattan in 
October 2006).138 The Police Commissioner responded that: “As a matter of Police 
Department policy, undercover officers and confidential informants do not enter 
a mosque unless they are following up on a lead vetted under Handschu.”139 Since 
the conversations recorded in police documents do not pertain to criminal or 
terrorist activity and a large number of mosques were apparently under surveillance, 
questions relating to whether the NYPD had specific leads and the nature of such 
“leads” remain unanswered. 
The evaluation of this type of issue would lie squarely within the competence of an inspector general who would 
have access to normally secret police documents and could evaluate compliance on a regular basis without 
intruding unduly on the Department’s operations. Indeed, as discussed previously, the LAPD inspector general 
conducts precisely this type of review.140 
Progressively higher levels of suspicion are required to open the next two investigatory levels: (preliminary inquiries141 and 
full investigations142) and the police are given greater flexibility in opening investigations of terrorist conspiracies.143 As 
with assessing whether the police properly complied with the rules regarding for following up on leads, an independent 
inspector general would be in a position to evaluate whether the police are complying with the rules for opening various 
types of investigations.
2.  Intelligence Collection
Under the Handschu Guidelines, the police are not limited to conducting investigations – they are also authorized 
to mount a broad range of other intelligence activities. As Commissioner Kelly has pointed out, the 2003 Handschu 
Guidelines permit the NYPD to “visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the same terms 
and conditions as members of the public generally” for the “purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities.”144 
Attending political events or religious services even where there is no suspicion of a link to terrorist activity – which 
was previously off limits to the NYPD145 – is now authorized unless it violates some other provision of the law.
The NYPD is, however, prohibited from retaining information obtained from such visits unless it “relates to potential 
unlawful or terrorist activity.”146 This ban is critical because it ensures that the police do not maintain dossiers on 
wholly innocent persons. In the wake of the AP’s investigation, the Handschu attorneys sought discovery from the 
NYPD to determine whether the police were violating this prohibition.147 Nine months later, when the attorneys 
were finally allowed to question the NYPD official in charge of the Intelligence Division, it became apparent that the 
police have no system for complying with the Handschu prohibition on keeping irrelevant 1st Amendment protected 
information.148 Ensuring that such a system was in place would be part of the job of an inspector general, who would 
also audit police files to ensure that the system worked and prohibited information was not retained.
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In short, compliance with the types of rules contained in the 2003 Handschu Guidelines, both for investigations 
and for intelligence operations, could be effectively and systematically reviewed by an independent inspector general.
b.  Other Litigation
Of course, the NYPD must abide by many legal requirements in addition to those contained in the 2003 Handschu 
Guidelines and litigation continues to be used to challenge a variety of police policies and practices. 
Most recently, a case has been filed in New Jersey, challenging the Department’s surveillance of American Muslims. 
Hasan v. City of New York claims that these practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act  because they discriminate on the basis of religion and that the 
surveillance program contravenes the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment because it is 
not neutral with respect to religion.149
The Department has also been engaged in ongoing litigation with respect to its stop and frisk policy.150 The settlement 
in the first stop and frisk lawsuit, Daniels v. City of New York, required the Department to maintain a written anti-
racial profiling policy that complied with the U.S. and New York State Constitutions and was binding on all NYPD 
officers.151 In 2002, the NYPD issued an internal order prohibiting “reliance on race, ethnicity, religion or national 
origin as the determinative factor in initiating police action against an individual.”152 The ban was subsequently 
enshrined in a 2004 New York City law.153 Despite these steps, the attorneys who brought the case faced continued 
difficulties in monitoring compliance with the consent decree.154 At the same time, stops of minority men, which 
had prompted the initial litigation, continued to rise dramatically.155 This led to yet another class action lawsuit 
challenging the same practices on the same Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection grounds.156 This case, Floyd v. 
City of New York, was recently certified as a class action.157 
There is no question that these types of lawsuits play an important role in addressing violations of the law by police 
and vindicating individual rights. But they are not a substitute for ongoing oversight. We rely, in the first instance, 
on our institutions of government to ensure that executive officials are operating within the law and to correct any 
violations. New York’s history of attempts to reform police practices through litigation shows the many challenges 
associated with such efforts and the ways in which an independent inspector general could work on an ongoing basis 
to identify needed reforms and to ensure that they are implemented. 
• • •
The oversight mechanisms used in the federal government and other police departments provide models for the 
NYPD. These mechanisms are geared towards ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the flexibility to conduct 
legitimate activities while at the same time providing a check against the potential for abuse.
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V.   lessons learned froM The InspeCTor General and polICe  
audITor oVersIGhT Models
The success of an inspector general – or indeed any similar oversight model, such as police auditors – is not guaranteed. 
Within the federal government we have seen more and less effective inspectors general;158 the same is true for police 
auditors.159 A close examination of the workings of federal inspectors general and police auditors indicates that 
there are several factors that contribute to the success of these types of oversight mechanisms: credibility, access to 
information, and the support of the relevant government institutions.160
a.  Credibility
Credibility is established, in part, by ensuring that the person appointed to the position is viewed as neutral and as 
having the requisite expertise. For example, the federal IG Act provides for presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation of inspectors general without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and 
demonstrated ability.161 Inspectors general are generally not tied to specific administrations. Fine, for example, 
was appointed as the inspector general of the DOJ by President Clinton and continued to serve under both 
Presidents Bush and Obama.162 An inspector general normally has broad discretion in selecting the subjects to be 
reviewed and in carrying out investigations, thus establishing independence from both the agency being overseen 
and political forces. The IG Act authorizes inspectors general to “undertake audits 
and investigations, access documents within and beyond their agencies, and carry 
out audits and investigations without interference from agency leadership. Within 
their very broad mandate, IGs may select issues for investigation as they see fit.”163 
Another aspect of credibility, that is particularly important for a police department, is 
how the community that it serves perceives the oversight mechanism. Traditionally, 
community leaders and activists who work on police accountability have been 
unconvinced that a police auditor can play an important role in police oversight.164 
One reason for this skepticism is that an auditor (like an inspector general) can only 
make recommendations which can be rejected by the police department. In many cases, however, the transparency 
provided by police auditors has contributed significantly to revealing to the public the practices of traditionally 
closed police departments. “[T]he power to dig deep into police departments, issue public reports, and conduct 
follow-up investigations has enormous value that should not be underestimated.”165  Moreover, even if the police 
department rejects the auditor’s or inspector general’s recommendations, the Mayor or City Council can always 
choose to take action, once armed with the information provided by the independent monitor. 
b.  Access 
Access to information and relevant personnel is critical for an inspector general’s success. Federal inspectors general 
can obtain all records within the agency they cover and can acquire records from other federal agencies.166 Employees 
who come forward to provide information to inspectors general are protected from retaliation and their identities 
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concealed if possible.167 Similarly, the LAPD inspector general has broad access to information. Employees of the 
department have “an affirmative duty to cooperate fully with the Inspector General and to provide complete, 
unrestricted and prompt access to inspect and/or photocopy all Los Angeles Police Department records accessible 
to the Board … including ongoing and in-progress matters” and the inspector general has subpoena power.168 The 
LAPD inspector general must be given “prompt access” to employees and those who complain to the inspector 
general are protected against retaliation.169  
C.  Support from other Governmental Bodies 
Finally, much of the power of federal inspectors general comes from their 
relationship with Congress. Even though federal inspectors general are located 
within the agencies they serve, they have a dual reporting role – in addition to reporting to their agency head, 
they must also submit detailed semiannual reports to Congress. This “helps Congress overcome information 
problems in supervising agencies.”170 Congress in turn ensures that inspectors general have the funding to 
carry out their vital oversight functions. Without the provision of adequate resources, the best-structured 
oversight model will fail. Congress’s ability to determine the appropriate level of resources was recently 
enhanced when the IG Act was amended to require budget submissions to Congress to include a statement 
from any inspector general about the adequacy of his or her budget.171
In the local policing context as well, the failure to provide resources can doom even the best conceived oversight 
efforts. In New York, chronic funding and staffing problems at the CCRB have contributed negatively to its 
image.172 Often this failure to provide financial support is attributed to a lack of “political will.” Indeed, given 
the difficulties the CCRB has faced in obtaining resources, credibility, and the cooperation of the NYPD, one 
can reasonably ask how one could expect an inspector general to succeed where the CCRB has failed.
Part of the answer lies in the nature of an inspector general’s duties. The CCRB is called upon to act when 
someone complains that a police officer has violated the law or police regulations; this tends to place it in an 
adversarial position vis-à-vis the NYPD. In contrast, an inspector general works to analyze policies and practices 
in an ongoing and non-adversarial fashion which should encourage greater cooperation from the police.
Another part of the answer lies in the unique reporting relationship between an inspector general and 
supervising bodies such as legislatures and independent police boards. Because Congress relies on federal 
inspectors general to provide it with information to perform its own oversight duties, it has an incentive to 
ensure that inspectors general are adequately funded and, where necessary, to provide them with political backing. 
Similarly, the LAPD’s Board of Police Commissioners depends on the inspector general there to conduct the 
detailed reviews that allow the Board to assess how the police force is functioning. In the context of the NYPD, 
the City Council and the Mayor would have an incentive to support the work of an inspector general because 
it would help them do their jobs. Certainly factors like political will, how the inspector general is perceived by 
the agency being reviewed, and even the integrity and qualifications of the individual appointed to the job are 
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important, and cannot be entirely controlled by legislation. Nonetheless, structural incentives can nudge these 
variables in the right direction.
nypd oVersIGhT proposal
Since the attacks of September 11th, federal intelligence agencies have been given enormous discretion to collect 
information about ordinary Americans. At the same time, oversight of these agencies has been enhanced. In 
contrast, the NYPD has created an enormous intelligence agency of its own that operates without any meaningful 
independent oversight.  
The experience of the federal government shows that independent oversight by an 
inspector general can increase the transparency, accountability, and effectiveness 
of intelligence operations. Major federal intelligence agencies – including the FBI 
and the CIA – have operated under this system for decades. This type of oversight 
is a democratic society’s first line of defense against the threat that intelligence 
operations can pose to our civil liberties. Municipal police departments too have 
found independent oversight helpful in addressing traditional police misconduct concerns. Such oversight could 
also increase public confidence in how the Department is carrying out policies that disproportionately affect 
minority communities, including stop and frisk. 
In recognition of how an inspector general can help the Department, there recently have been efforts to bring 
the NYPD within the DOI fold, with the introduction of a bill to that effect in the New York State legislature.173 
According to its sponsors, the bill was prompted by “a growing pattern of behavior [that] has emerged from the 
New York Police Department that inhibits public accountability and transparency.”174 Another bill, supported 
by a bipartisan majority of the New York City Council, would establish an inspector general outside the DOI 
to oversee the Department.175 Whatever mechanism is ultimately selected, it should incorporate those elements 
of other inspector general models that have been critical to success. In particular, legislation should: provide 
for an inspector general who is independent and has sufficient powers to carry out the mandate, including 
the ability to collect necessary information; require regular reporting to the Mayor and the City Council to 
increase the transparency of the Department’s policies and practices; protect confidential information; and 
allocate sufficient resources.
The NYPD Inspector General: Key Points
Independence
•	 The success of inspectors general depends greatly on their independence (real and perceived) 
from the agencies they monitor. To enhance independence, the appointment of the inspector 
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general should be made without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of 
integrity and demonstrated ability in relevant fields.
 
•	 In the federal system, inspectors general usually reside within the agency they monitor, 
but that is not generally the case for auditors and inspectors general who oversee police 
departments. Regardless of whether the inspector general is placed inside or outside the 
NYPD, there should be a requirement of regular reporting both to the Mayor and the City 
Council. If the Mayor and the City Council view the inspector general as useful in helping 
them to carry out their oversight responsibilities, they will be more likely to protect the 
inspector general’s independence.
Authority
•	 The inspector general should be free to determine which reviews to conduct, but the City 
Council should be permitted to suggest subjects for review. This would allow the inspector 
general discretion in mounting reviews; but elected officials, representing various communities, 
could also direct the office’s attention to particular issues.
•	 To ensure there is sufficient documentation to support oversight, the inspector general’s first task 
should be to review the NYPD’s record-keeping practices, particularly with respect to intelligence 
gathering. Such a review would set a baseline for future work. 
•	 The inspector general should have access to all relevant documents and personnel available to 
the NYPD. 
•	 It should be clear that the inspector general’s authority does not extend to requiring the NYPD 
to take corrective action of any kind. Rather, the inspector general should be limited to offering 
recommendations. The Mayor, the Police Commissioner, and the City Council must decide 
whether and how to act on the inspector general’s recommendations.  
Transparency
•	 Reporting to the Mayor and the City Council should be regular and systematic. In addition 
to keeping them informed about the findings of reviews, the inspector general should monitor 
and report on the status of prior recommendations. This transparency could be achieved 
through semiannual reports, as well as special reports on particularly serious matters. The Police 
Commissioner should, of course, be allowed the opportunity to present the Department’s view 
on inspector general reports, thus ensuring a full airing of the issues. 
•	 To promote transparency and access to government information, the inspector general should 
maintain a public website that would include reports and a portal for questions or complaints.
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Confidentiality
•	 It is critical to protect confidential information when conducting police oversight. The inspector 
general should redact from reports any information that is legally prohibited from disclosure, as 
well as any sensitive, non-public information that pertains to ongoing investigations of criminal 
or terrorist activity. The Police Commissioner should be authorized to prevent the inspector 
general from disclosing the names and personally identifying information of informants, other 
sources, witnesses, and suspects. The inspector general should also consider additional requests 
to redact information when the Commissioner believes disclosure would cause a specific and 
imminent threat to safety. In those instances in which information is redacted, the inspector 
general should issue two versions of the report: a non-public version containing all information 
for City officials, and a redacted version for the public. 
•	 The identity of officers who make good-faith complaints to the inspector general should remain 
confidential, whenever possible. These officers should also be protected against any form of 
retaliation. These practices are intended to encourage candor from officers, and augment the 
inspector general’s effectiveness. 
Resources
•	 The inspector general’s budget should be adequate to achieve the office’s mandate. One way of 
increasing transparency about resources would be to require that the inspector general’s budget 
be separately identified. The inspector general should also have an opportunity to comment on 
the proposed budget if he or she believes that the requested funds are insufficient to perform 
mandated duties. 
ConClusIon
An inspector general is not a panacea that will prevent or address every complaint about the NYPD. But the 
experience of the federal government and several local police departments shows that systematic, ongoing oversight 
by an independent outside monitor can help bring transparency and accountability to police operations. This type 
of oversight is particularly important for the NYPD, which has created a large, worldwide intelligence agency. 
When a police department undertakes extensive activities in this realm, where almost all actions are clandestine, 
it is critical that there be an independent and neutral entity charged with the responsibility for ensuring that the 
police operate within the law. An inspector general would also greatly assist the City Council and the Mayor 
in responsibly exercising their own oversight over the Department through regular reporting that uncovers and 
assesses any problems or deficiencies. These institutions must, however, play their part. Creating an inspector 
general for the NYPD would be a first step in fulfilling these responsibilities and would lead to a stronger, more 
effective, police department. 
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police corruption by placing him in a psychiatric ward. Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes Confirmed, 
Village Voice (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-03-07/news/the-nypd-tapes-confirmed.
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of the City of New York, Committee on Public Safety, Transcript of the Minutes April 18, 2005, 137-144. 
101   The Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) consists of thirteen members: five appointed by the mayor, 
five by the City Council, and three by the Police Commissioner. N.Y.C. Charter § 440(b)(1).
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136   Handschu Aug. 2003 Decision, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 422. The NYPD Patrol Guide defines “lead” for purposes 
of the Guidelines as either: 1) information “submitted to or obtained or developed by the Intelligence 
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activity.” Id.  § 212-72 (Procedure). 
137   See N.Y. Police Dep’t, NYPD Intelligence Note: NYC Mosque Statements on Danish Cartoon 
Controversy (2006), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_cartoons.
pdf. In some instances, these reports covered several days. For example, there were reports from the Jamaica 
Muslim Center on three dates: February 3rd, 4th and 7th. Reports over multiple days were also recorded for the 
Iqra Mosque, the Makki Mosque and the Islamic Cultural Center of New York (ICCNY). Id.
138   See N.Y. Police Dep’t, NYPD Intelligence Note (2006), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/
interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_planecrash.pdf.
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139   Raymond W. Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t, Remarks by Police Commissioner Kelly to Fordham 
Law School Alumni (Mar. 3, 2012) [hereinafter “Kelly Fordham Speech”], available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2012_03_03_remarks_to_fordham_law_school_alumni.shtml. Such vetting, said the 
Commissioner, consists of “written authorization from the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.” Id.
140   See supra text accompanying notes 64-81.
141   Preliminary inquiries are intended to “allow[ ] the NYPD to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or 
incomplete information, with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation permit. This is especially important 
in such areas where there is no complaint involved or when an allegation or information is received from a 
source of unknown reliability.” P.G., supra note 133, § 212-72 (Appendix B(V)(B)(2). A preliminary inquiry is 
permitted when the police have “information or an allegation not warranting an investigation - because there is 
not a ‘reasonable indication’ of unlawful activity - but whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny 
beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads.” Id. § 212-72 (Appendix B(V)(B)(1)). 
In a preliminary inquiry, without any prior authorization of a supervisor, an investigator may conduct physical, 
photographic or video surveillance, interview the subject or other people who could have information about the 
investigation, examine governmental or other public records and police files, and interview previously established 
informants. Id. § 212-72 (Appendix B(V)(B)(6)).
142   A full investigation is authorized when “facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an unlawful act has 
been, is being, or will be committed.” Id. § 212-72 (Appendix B(V)(C)). The reasonable indication standard 
is “substantially lower than probable cause;” but “[s]pecific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, 
or future violation” are required and a “mere hunch” is insufficient to meet this standard. Id. § 212-72 
(Appendix B(V)(C)(1)). Once a full investigation is launched, the police are explicitly authorized to use the 
full panoply of investigatory techniques available to them. 
143   Terrorism enterprise investigations (TEI) may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that 
two or more people are engaged to further “political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve 
force, violence or other unlawful acts” or engage in certain defined terrorist or criminal activity. Id. § 212-72 
(Appendix B(V)(D)(1)(a)). In opening a TEI, the police must meet the normal standard for a full investigation – 
i.e., they must have a “reasonable indication” that an unlawful act has been, is being, or will be committed – but 
they may also consider “the magnitude of the threatened harm.” Id. Since the threatened harm is likely to be large 
in most (if not all) suspected terrorist conspiracies, the threshold for opening a TEI is effectively significantly lower 
than that for opening a normal criminal investigation. Other factors that may be considered are: the likelihood that 
harm will occur, the immediacy of the threat, and the danger to privacy or free expression from the investigation. 
144   P.G., supra note 133, § 212-72 (Appendix B(VIII)(A)(2)). Commissioner Kelly has repeatedly emphasized this 
aspect of the Handschu Guidelines. See City Council Mar. 15, 2012 Transcript, supra note 91, at 6; Kelly Fordham 
Speech supra note 139.
145   The original Handschu Guidelines required that police complete an investigation statement specifying the 
factual predicate for an investigation before they could attend public events. 1985 Handschu Guidelines, 605 F. 
Supp. at 1422.
146    P.G., supra note 133, § 212-72 (Appendix B(VIII)(A)(2)).
 
147   The order to show cause filed by the Handschu attorneys is available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/
Order_to_Show_Cause_and_Declaration_10.3.11.pdf, and related court filings are available at http://www.
nyclu.org/news/court-filing-seeks-information-nypd-surveillance-targeting-muslims.
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148   Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71CIV.2203, Galati Dep. 128-129 (June 28, 2012), available at http://
www.nyclu.org/files/releases/Handschu_Galati_6.28.12.pdf.
149   Complaint, Hassan v. City of New York, No. 12CV03401 (D.N.J. filed June 6, 2012).
150  Although this practice is commonly referred to as “stop and frisk,” including in this report, it consists of three 
elements: the stopping of individuals, questioning them and frisking them. 
151   Stipulation of Settlement at 5, Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 
2003), available at  http://ccrjustice.org/files/Daniels_StipulationOfSettlement_12_03_0.pdf.
152   N.Y. Police Dep’t, Operations Order 11: Department Policy Regarding Racial Profiling (2002). 
153   The City law bars the police from relying on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin as the “determinative 
factor in initiating law enforcement action against an individual.” N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 14–151. 
As is typical of bans on racial profiling, the New York City law allows the police to rely on race or ethnicity 
as part of a suspect description. Id. § 14-151(1). This law does not, however, explicitly provide for a private 
right of action and the issue of whether this remedy is available has not yet been tested in court. 
154   See Al Baker and Emily Vasquez, Number of People Stopped by New York Police Soars, N.Y. Times (Feb. 3, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/03/nyregion/03frisk.html?pagewanted=print. 
155   See supra note 1.
156   See Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
157   See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2012 WL 1868637, at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012). 
The very same day, the Police Commissioner announced three steps he was taking to “increase public 
confidence” in stop and frisk: 1) republishing the NYPD order prohibiting racial profiling; 2) requiring 
review of stop and frisk paperwork; and 3) implementing audits of stop and frisk paperwork. Letter from 
Police Commissioner Kelly to New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn (2012), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/17/nyregion/17stopandfrisk.html. Ten years after the Daniels 
settlement, the Department is implementing measures of the type that the court had originally imposed as 
part of the consent decree in that case.
158   See Sinnar, supra note 42 (manuscript at 32-33).
159   See Walker, supra note 78, at 163-167.
160    In April 2003, all 12 police auditors drafted a set of Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor’s Office. 
These are reproduced as a diagram in Walker’s book. The principles essentially track the elements of success 
identified here. See id. at 168, Figure 6.2.
161   Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409 § 2, 122 Stat. 4302 (2008) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. App. 3 § 8G(c)). Although inspectors general serve at the President’s pleasure, the statute requires 
that the reasons for the dismissal of any inspector general must be communicated to Congress at least 30 days 
prior to removal. Id.§ 3(b) (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 8G(e)(2)) Prior to the Inspector General Reform 
Act of 2008, the President was required to communicate the reasons for dismissal of an inspector general to 
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